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Being considered as one of the world's leading financial 
centres along with New York, London, Tokyo and Zurich, 
it is somehow surprising, or amazing, to see that one 
major arm of Hong Kong's rather well-developed financial 
body has not been growing at the same pace as its other 
arms. This "immature arm" is the Hong Kong domestic debt 
capital market. 
In the first place, the scope of the Hong Kong debt 
capital market refers to the Hong Kong dollar market as 
distinguished from the Euro dollar (US dollar) market. 
This means that activities in this market are solely 
demoninated in Hong Kong dollar. Secondly, capital 
market is also to be differentiated from money market。 
In broad terms, the money market is the economic arena 
in which short term credit instruments are bought and 
sold. It is a vital part of a country's financial system 
and is the market in which commercial banks and other 
businesses adjust their liquidity positions. The 
government or the central bank (as the case in other 
countries) also make use of the money market to conduct 
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its monetary policy. In the money market, businesses, 
government, and sometimes individuals borrow or lend 
funds for short periods. Generally speaking, money 
market instruments are financial claims that have lower 
default risk, shorter maturities, and higher 
marketability. 
In contrast, capital market involves financial claims 
with relatively higher degree of price risk。 Instruments 
in the capital market include common and preferred 
stocks, debt securities with maturities greater than one 
year and mutual funds. Because of the lenghty maturities 
that exist with the securities, the existence of a 
secondary market is especially important because it 
allows investors and financial institutions to alter the 
liquidity, composition, and risk of their portfolio in 
response to new information and/or to changes in general 
market conditions. The dividing line for money market 
and capital market is, nevertheless, not so clear 
especially when different market practises exist» For 
example, in the United States, Certificate of Deposit 
usually carries maturities of one year or less while in 
Hong Kong, this instrument generally carries maturities 
beyond one year. Meanwhile, Commercial Paper usually 
have a tenor of less than one year but is generally 
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treated as capital market instrument. This is probably 
because Commercial Paper is a securitized instrument and 
is traded in the secondary market. In Hong Kong, the 
money market is basically composed of commercial banking 
activities while the capital market is largely composed 
of investment banking business plus activities in the 
stock exchange. 
As explained, capital market includes debt and equity 
activities. Debt financing and equity financing are 
basically operating in different environment and it is 
convenient to treat them differently. In Hong Kong, the 
equities market has a long history and rather well 
established infrastructure, especially after the Davison 
Reform in the aftermath of the 1987 October crash\ It is 
the debt capital market that is the "underdeveloped arm它衫 
of the financial body. 
The scope of this project is confined to the examination 
of the Hong Kong domestic debt market. The project will 
basically be split into two main sections. The first 
section, from chapter two to chapter six is on the 
development and history of the domestic Hong Kong dollar 
market。 Historical data and facts will be presented and 
focus will be on how and why the market has started off, 
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What the instruments are, who the major participants 
are, and why the market has been growing, or, rather, 
not growing. The second part, from chapter seven to 
chapter nine, is an analysis on the factors influencing 
the development of the market. This will be analysed in 
terms of demand and supply. Chapter ten will be a 
conclusion on the analysis. 
Difficulties in this analysis relate mostly to the lack 
of information as there is little documented work 
relating to the subject. In addition, due to the 
relatively short history of the debt market and small 
number of market players, adequate historical data is 
also insufficient and sampling work is also not 
meaningful. Therefore, most of the data available is 
sourced from key leading market partictipants on 
confidential basis. 
For those who know little about the market, terms used 
by market particiapants, like "Bull and Bear Bonds〜 
"Heaven and Hell Bonds", "FRN", etc look fascinating. 
For those who have been in the market for long, the 
market may really have been heaven and hell。 The aim of 
this project is to diagnose the history and development 
of the market, to examine the factors for the growth and 
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to analyse the difficulties faced by the market. The 
significance of the analysis is on whether the 
expectation of a well-grown, matured capital market is 
beyond reach, or, are there any required criteria or 
circumstances that have to exist before this could be 
achieved. It is expected that the result of such 
analysis can provide implications on where the market 
would go, and how market participants or the Government 
can formulate policy to foster the development of the 
financial market in Hong Kong. 
CHAPTER 2 
HISTORY OF THE HONG KONG DOMESTIC CAPITAL MARKET 
“Hong Kong - Hong Kong's domestic capital 
market has undergone a rapid transformation over 
the past 18 months. 
Once a sleepy little bazaar that attracted 
only a few borrowers, it has become Asians 
fastest growing financial market.“ 
November 7, 1986 
Asian Wall Street Journal 
“Last year was a year of further consolidation, 
of particular note were the abolition of withholding 
tax, the first issue in Hong Kong dollars by the 
World Bank and the first convertible bond issue。 
But not everything is as rosy as it sounds。 In 1989, 
the volume of fixed rate paper issued was about 
HK$ 4.2 billion against HK$ 5.4 billion in 1988. 
This shinkage has continued since 1986 and now it is 
difficult to replace the paper maturing let alone 
think about expanding and developing the market. 
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This will become particularly difficult in 1991 when 
nearly HK$ 10 billion of all paper outstanding will 
mature.“ 
February 18, 199 0 
South China Morning Post 
The above two quotations reflect to a large extent 
market sentiment towards the growth of the Hong Kong 
dollar capital market at different stages of time in 
1986 and 1990. 
Prior to 1981, involvement by corporate borrowers in the 
capital market was limited. From time to time, corporate 
names came to the market with fixed rate issues, for 
example, Mass Transit Railway issued a Ten-Year HK$ 4 00 
Million Fixed Rate Bond in 1976, but many of these were 
generally equity linked. As corporate treasurers became 
more sophisticated, plus increasing liquidity in the 
international capital market, many new funding 
techniques have become available. These include 
Commercial Paper (CP), Certificate of Deposits (CDs), 
Floating Rate Notes (FRN), and Corporate Bonds, 
collectively described as debt instruments。 
8 
In 1981, Commercial Paper issuance facilities and CD 
issuance facilities were introduced to the Hong Kong 
capital market but it was not until late 1983 that 
active interest in these instruments were developed» In 
1984, the Floating Rate Note made its debut in the Hong 
Kong capital Market. The market for such instrument was 
relatively inactive due to size constraint since thus 
far there had been only four issues totalling HK$ 1。8 
billion. The first issue was for the Mass Transit 
Railway Corp. The market underwent a significant change 
in 1985• Fixed rate issues took over floating rate 
issues' traditionally predominant role in the market« 
The motivations for securitization are complex but could 
be explained by market forces operating on both the 
supply and demand sides• On the demand side, borrowers 
are attracted by cheaper alternative source of finance, 
while investors also appreciate the availability of 
financial assets that combines competitive returns with 
liquidity and marketability. On the supply side, 
financial institutions need new and more flexible 
techniques to tap wholesale deposits and to raise 
capital. Meanwhile, the desire to earn fee income, and 
to engage in off-balance sheet activities to circumvent 
regulatory controls also plays an important role. 
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In Hong Kong, major borrowers in the capital market are 
banks and large corporations. For banks, capital market 
provides an efficient and cheaper source for them to 
raise long term funds. This route is especially 
important for banks with no funding source from retail 
depositors. For corporates, they also raise cheaper and 
longer term funds via the capital maraket. Funds raised 
are mostly for general working capital purposes, for 
long term corporate expansion or for special project 
financing. 
Chart 1 shows the volume of new issues of Hong Kong 
dollar securities from 1980 to 1989。 The chart shows 
that the debt market had really started since 1984 and 
experienced two booming years in 1985 and 1986. The 
total volume of Hong Kong dollar capital market issues 
increased from approximately HK$ 4.5 billion in 1984 to 
HK$ 16.5 billion in 1985 and to about HK$ 20 billion in 
1986« However, the market started shrinking immediately 
afterwards. After a rapid expansion during the bull 
years of 1984 to 1986, the volume of activities declined 
to a level where only a few houses could afford to stay. 
The result was a transformation between 1986 to 1988 
from a trading marke七 place plagued by over-supply to a 






































































































































































































































































































































































VOLUME OF NEW ISSUES OF HK$ SECURITIES 
(HK$ MILLION) 
YEAR EQUITY ISSUES QUOTED DEBT UNQUOTED DEBT 
1980 5036 2820 520 
1981 10321 0 1695 
1982 1661 0 2120 
1983 1564 390 1600 
1984 2797 1000 5010 
1985 3102 0 19055 
1986 8685 400 18756 
1987 31300 1500 10725 
1988 9862 1200 6738 
1989 6404 1500 9237 
Source : Manufacturers Hanover Asia Ltd 
•I. I 
paper disappears until maturity within three months of 
issue. 
Chart 2 shows the number of Debt issues by currencies。 
In 1986, Hong Kong dollar debt issues ranks seventh with 
ninety—six issues launched. The number dropped to 
twenty-eight in 1989 and Hong Kong dollar ranks tenth。 
Chart 3 shows the same comparison by volume in US dollar 
terms。 In 1986, total volume of Hong Kong dollar was 
over USD equivalent 2 billion but has drastically come 
down to USD equivalent 368 million in 1989. 
It is necessary to look at the nature and 
characteristics of different capital market instruments 
before analyzing the factors for the growth and 
subsequent shrinkage of the Hong Kong capital markete 
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CHAPTER 3 
CAPITAL MARKET INSTRUMENTS 
There are principally five types of instruments in the 
Hong Kong Dollar debt market. They are s 
1/ Commercial Paper (CP) 
2/ Floating Rate Notes (FRN) 
3/ Floating Rate Certificate of Deposits (FRCD) 
4/ Fixed Rate Bonds 
5/ Fixed Rate Certificate of Deposits 
Chart 4 shows the composition of the Hong Kong capital 
market by volume of these different instruments. 
Commercial Paper 
Commercial Paper Facilities (also known as Discounted 
Bills of Exchange Facilities) were first introduced to 
the Hong Kong debt market in the late seventies and 
early eighties. The first CP Facility underwritten by 
banking institutions was issued in 1981。 However, it 
was not until late 1983 that active interest in the 






























































































































































































































































































































































BREAKDOWN OF QUOTED & UNQUOTED DEBT 
‘ INSTRUMENTS IN VOLUME TERMS 
(HK$ MILLION) 
YEAR QUOTED FRCP CP FIXED FRN 
DEBT ‘ 
1980 2820 520 0 0 0 
1981 0 1195 500 0 0 
1982 0 1920 200 0 0 
1983 390 850 750 0 0 
1984 1000 1450 2750 310 500 
1985 0 900 9660 7185 1310 
1986 400 1050 3025 11331 3350 
1987 1500 1749 4140 4436 400 
1988 1200 650 700 5388 0 
1989 1500 2270 2800 4167 • 
Source ： Manufacturers Hanover Asia Ltd 
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Utility and real estate companies tried to tap the 
market to achieve a lower funding rate than conventional 
short-term bank loan. Corporates that can borrow at a 
1/2% interest margin via conventional bank loan can very 
often achieve a much lower margin at 1/8% via CP。 Before 
1985, the growth of the market was inhibited by the 
ambiguous legal position of CP issues。 Their legal 
standing was questionable with respect to the provisions 
of the Deposit-Taking Companies (DTC) Ordinance 1976 and 
Protection of Investors Ordinance 1974• In theory, as 
the bills could be sold to the public, it was arguable 
that the issuers could be raising fund from the public 
via the instrument in contravention of the DTC 
Ordinance. In addition, since the instrument could also 
be viewed as investments, it was also argued that the 
issue also needed to be covered by the provisions of the 
Protection of Investors Ordinance. In December 1985, the 
offices of the Secretary for Monetary Affairs and the 
Attnorey General gave the opinion that CP issues did not 
contravene the DTC Ordinance but they had to comply with 
the requirements of the Protection of Investors 
2 
Ordinance. 
CP Facilities are often underwritten, providing the 
issuer with committed funds on agreed terms and 
.1 7 
conditions, for which an underwriting fee is paid. As 
the funds are required by the issuer, bills with terms 
of one, two, or three months are made available to 
investors, normally through tender penal distribution, 
or, more recently, via dealers<> The attractions of CP 
issues are : 
1/ The borrower gets a committed long term CP issuance 
facility (usually three to five years) but is paying 
short-term interest rates (ie, 1, 2, or 3 months 
interbank rates) only when they need to issue CP. 
Therefore, they enjoy the availability of long term 
committed funding without paying greater risk premium 
for longer maturities. 
2/ CP facility is flexible in that the issuer can raise 
money only when it has the need. 
3/ Funding spread is usually lower than direct bank 
loans。 Subject to receptive market conditions, top 
quality borrowers in Hong Kong are able to borrow at 
less than 1/8% margin over Hong Kong Interbank Offered 
Rate (HIBOR)• The reason is that for companies with good 
credit quality, investors are ready to invest directly 
in CP with higher return than placing as bank deposit. 
:1 a 
Before 1989, due to the existence of a 15.5% withholding 
tax (applicable to Hong Kong dollar deposits placed with 
non-financial institutions) and an anomaly in the tax 
system (to be explained in later section) which 
encouraged corporates to place their surplus funds 
overseas or in foreign currency deposits, investors of 
CP had been restricted primarily to financial 
institutions, with the abolition of withholding tax in 
April 1, 1989, CP is becoming more attractive to 
non-bank investors and is therefore a more interesting 
product to trade. The real break-through in this market 
will only come if the tax treatment for corporate 
investors makes CP comparable with offshore deposits。 
This will be discussed later in further details. 
Currently, there are facilities in place for about HK$ 
17 billion, of which the average outstatanding at any 
one time are only about HK$ 5 billion^ 
Floating Rate Notes (FRN) 
FRNs are negotiable instruments evidencing deposits 
placed by the holder or bearer of the Note to the issuer 
and repayable at maturitye They are securities on which, 
the quarterly or semi-annual interest rate is linked and 
determined on a floating index, for example, the London 
.19 
Interbank rate for three or six month Eurodollar deposit 
(LIBOR), or Hongkong Interbank Offered Rate (HIB〇R)• The 
quarterly or semi-annual coupon on a FRN is re-fixed by 
an Agent Bank every three or six months (depending on 
the interest payment period of that FRN) at a stated 
margin over the floating index. Tenor of FRN usually 
ranges from over two years to over ten years, since any 
bank wishing to issue floating rate debt does so through 
the CD route, floating rate note issues in Hong Kong 
dollar are limited to leading local corporations like 
MTRC, Hongkong Land, Cheung Kong, Swire, and Sun Hung 
Kei Properties etc. For the borrower, FRN is a cheaper 
alternative than long term bank loan as they are issued 
at a lower margin. In addition, it has been a common 
practise for corporate treasurers to balance the 
company's long term debts between floating and fixed 
interest payment when future interest movement is 
uncertain. FRN is a major instrument to achieve floating 
rate payments. Unlike bank loan, FRNs are usually 
unsecured obligations of the borrower and therefore this 
instrument has largely been confined to high credit 
quality corporations. The appeal to investors is that 
FRNs are traded in the market and can be a good 
investment when interest rate is expected to rise。 
I 香 遞 中 文 大 學 因 當 馆 藏 q 
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In 1984, the first FRN was issued by MTRC。 The market 
has seen some interesting concepts like Miniinaxes,4 Bulls 
and Bears,5 Mismatched and so on, but, because of the old 
withholding tax, it has mostly been a bank investor 
product. With the recent abolition of withholding tax, a 
broader group of investors may appear but a dramatic 
increase in the volume of issues is not expected. This 
is because when compared to a loan or a CP facility, 
there is no longer sufficiently large cost saving to the 
borrower to compensate for the FRN^s inflexibility on 
drawdown and choice of interest periods. 
Floating Rate Certificate of Deposits (FRCPs) 
While floating rate notes are issued by corporates, 
floating rate CDs are the corresponding instrument by 
banks。 Certificate of Deposits (CDs) are a fairly short 
to medium term negotiable instrument evidencing a 
deposit of a fixed amount repayable to bearer with 
interest paid generally quarterly or semiannually in 
arrear. Maturities of CDs vary from between eighteen 
months to seven years. 
The chart shows rthat volume of floating rate CDs has 
never been great. This is because they are issued by 
2：1 
banks at considerable cost both in terms of flexibility 
and margin over interbank rates. Even a first—tier 
European bank would have to pay 3 month HIB〇R plus 
around 10 basis point which makes little sense when 
there is good liquidity for such names in the interbank 
market and above all, they can achieve 10 basis point or 
more under HIBOR by issuing in the fixed rate and swap 
the proceeds with a Hong Kong corporate. This will be 
discussed in a later section. As shown in the previous 
charts, floating rate CDs were popular before 1985, time 
before such swap was introduced. In addition, FRCDs are 
popular when investors view that interest rates are 
rising and would not be ready to receive fixed return, 
or when the fixed-floating swap market is not active. 
One interesting recent development is several banks are 
forced to resort to the floating rate market as 
investors were not ready to commit long term fixed 
investment. This was evidenced by the launching of 
several floating rate issues by the International Bank 
of Asia (IBA), and Citibank in early 1990。 As will be 
explained later. Hong Kong dollar deposits dropped 
significantly during early 1990 and investors have 
refrained from investing in long term fixed rate 
instruments due to lack of confidence in the future 
outlook of Hong Kong dollar. 
2 2 
Fixed Rate Paper 
The discussion in this section on fixed rate paper will 
include both fixed rate bonds and fixed rate CDs。 Fixed 
rate bonds are issued by corporates while fixed rate CDs 
are issued by banks. They are negotiable instruments 
with quarterly or semi-annual (or even annual) coupon 
interest payments at a fixed rate which is determined at 
the time of issuance. The coupon payment will not be 
affected by subsequent interest rate movements but the 
price of the fixed rate instrument will change. Its 
price will rise when interest rate falls and vice versa 
so investors may incur capital gain or loss. 
Just like FRNs, fixed rate bonds are also confined to 
large local corporations with sufficiently high credit 
quality that can induce investor interest。 Fixed rate 
paper has been the most important instrument in Hong 
Kong. The figures show that the current market size is 
not inconsiderable with nearly HK$ 26 billion (USD 3。3 
Billion) outstanding. Over 80% of this is made up of 
unlisted instruments such as the World Bank 1995 bond 
(HK$ 500 million). Paribus' Bull and Bear (HK$ 1 
billion), Mass Transit Railway HK$ 200 million Step-Up 
Bonds, and a little of Hongkong Land and HutichsonJ 
2 0 
Fixed rate paper is popular among borrowers because 
borrowers can lock in fixed funding cost and future 
cashflow will not be affected by interest rate 
movements. For many corporates whose main business is 
not in financial management, guaranteed fixed rata 
funding is very important for corporate planning and 
cashflow projections. Sound liquidity is a vital concern 
for corporations and therefore so long as interest rate 
is at an acceptable level, corporates are ready to 
forego future possible rate decrease in return for 
eliminating any risk of unexpected unfavourable movement 
in interest rate. Meanwhile, for banks, fixed rate CDs 
have gained its heydays since the emergence of the swap 
market. For most banks, their funding source is usually 
through the interbank market which is on floating basis. 
Therefore, banks are generally not ready to raise fixed 
rate money and fund it via floating. On the other hand, 
corporates are more ready to pay fixed for cashflow 
management. A swap between the bank and corporate can 
meet the needs for both parties with mutual benefitsc 
This will be analysed in a later section on swaps. 
Maturity of fixed rate CDs is usually three to five 
years with interest rate payable quarterly„ The average 
size for one issue is around HK$ 100 to HK$ 200 million. 
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CHAPTER 10 
HOW THE MARKET HAS STARTED TO BOOM 
This chapter examines how and why the market has 
started. As shown in the chart, capital market 
activities began to flourish in 1985• There were 
basically three reasons for this : 
1/ The emergence of "Swaps" and the introduction of 
"Swaps" into the Hong Kong capital Market. 
2/ Favourable interest rate scenario 
3/ Sophistication of local corporate borrowers 
Emergence of "Swap" 
The bull market in 85 and 86 was explained partly by the 
emergence of the "Swap Market". Swaps, unheard of 
anywhere until a few years ago, had been fast becoming a 
central aspect of the development of cpaital market 
products. Before 1984, nobody knew about this strange 
animal. Since 1985, the capital market underwent a major 
change as fixed rate issues took over floating rate 
instruments' predominent role in the market» This change 
was a result of banks' recognition of the attraction in 
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swapping proceeds from fixed rate issues into floating 
rate sub-HIBOR (lower than Hong Kong Interbank Offered 
rate) funds. The basic rationale behind the swap is 
credit arbitrage between different borrrowers in the 
floating rate market and the fixed rate markets 
A swap is essentially an agreement to exchange interest 
payments and/or currency payments between two parties 
whereby Party A agrees to pay the interest and/or the 
principal repayments of Party B's borrowings, and in 
return Party B agrees to pay interest and/or the 
principal repayments of Party A,s borrowings„ This 
allows an issuer to swap from fixed to floating rate 
interest or vice versa, or to access other currencies 
(ie, other capital markets) by swapping with a party 
which has an exposure to the required market c 
While there is no official data on the number of swaps 
being done on a yearly basis during this period (this is 
because swaps are usually hidden behind fixed rate CD 
issues and are not revealed to public), seventy-two 
percent of the fixed rate CD issued in 1985 was swap 
driven? One of the first swap deals reported in the 
middle of 1985 was the Bank of Toyko HK$ 100 million CD 
with a 3-cornered interest rate swap arranged by Wardley 
for the Hongkong Land Co Ltd. Large corporates like 
Hongkong Land, MTRC , Kowloon Electricity Supply Co Ltd 
(KESCO) and China Light and Power (CLP) etc had 
undertaken the exercise of swapping from floating into 
fixed rate and therefore encouraged the further 
development of the fixed rate CD market. The mechanism 
of an interest rate swap works as follows and is based 
on two premises t 
1/ Due to greater liquidity in the bank lending market, 
borrowers usually can achieve a lower all-in interest 
margin from borrowing floating rate bank loan. This is 
largely due to greater supply of funds in the bank 
lending market. 
2/ Triple A banks usually can borrow at a lower cost 
than corporates in both the fixed rate and floating rate 
market due to better credit rating. 
Based on the above premises, the following example could 
be constructed : 
All- in borrowing cost 
Fixed rate Floating rate 
Triple A Bank 10% HIBOR flat 
HK Corporate < 12% HIBOR + 0.50% 
Difference 2% 0»5% 
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The above shows that the Bank is at an absolute 
advantage borrowing from both the fixed and floating 
markets, but is at comparative advantage in the fixed 
rate market. The credit spread in total between the two 
borrowers in the two markets is 1.5% (2% miruis 0o5%). 
However, as explained before, the Bank does not want to 
have fixed rate liabilities as it is usually funded in 
the interbank market via floating. Meanwhile, as for the 
Corporate, despite that it can borrow cheaper in 
floating, it prefers fixed rate funds usually due to 
guaranteed cashflow. 
Utilizing the concept of comparative advantage, a swap 
helps to benefit both. Assumes that the Bank wants to 
save 1% (against its original cost at paying floating 
HIBOR flat)； and the Corporate wants to save 0.5% as 
against its original cost at paying 12% fixed (total 
saving of 1.5% which is the credit spread due to 
arbitrage)• Since the Triple A Bank has greater 
advantage in the fixed rate market, it raises the fund 
in the fixed market paying 10%. This can be achieved by 
a Fixed Rate CD issue. And the Corporate then borrows 
from bank at floating HIBOR + 0.5%. They then swap the 
interest payment so that the Bank will pay floating 
While the Corporate will pay fixed. The swap will be 
constructed so that the Bank will pay HIBOR to the 
Corporate and the Corporate will pay 11% fixed to the 
Bank. The new all-in cost for both will become 二 
Triple A Bank HK Corporate 
Outflow 1/ CD 一 10% 1/ Loan - HIBOR f 0。5% 
2/ swap - HIBOR 2/ swap - 11% 
Inflow 1/ swap + 11% 1/ swap + HIBOR 
Net cost HIBOR 一 1% Fixed 11.5% 
Original cost HIBOR flat Fixed 12% 
A diagramatic presentation of the above is like this ？ 
fixed rate floating rate 
CD bank debt 
个 
10% Hibor 
‘―~—r Hibor ； 
Triple A > HK 
Bank < Corporate 
、 11名 
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The Bank thus pays HIBOR less 1% as compared with its 
original floating rate at HIBOR flat and therefore 1% is 
saved. The Corporate now pays 11.5% fixed as compared 
with its original fixed rate at 12% and 0。5% is saved« 
The availability of swap explains why the CD market has 
been dominated by fixed rate issues (tied with swaps) 
instead of floating rate issues since 1985. The concept 
of swaps has contributed a lot to the development of 
capital market. 
2/ Interest Rate scenario 
The second reason for the booming 1985 and 1986 was the 
interest rate scenario. Average interest rate during 
that time was at historical low around 5% to 6% 。 The 
low interest rate environment has two major impacts on 
capital market development. 
In the first place, low interest rate has induced more 
corporate borrowers to enter into swaps as fixed rate 
payers. Recognizing that prevailing interest rate was at 
historical low, corporate borrowers found it attactive 
to lock in fixed rate cheap financing for the coining few 
years via the swap. As analysed, this has facilitated 
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the growing number of fixed rate CD during that period. 
On the other hand, low interest rates also resulted in 
positive impact on investors. At its infant stage, the 
market was almost wholly dominated by professional 
investors, or financial institutions!^ These were 
principally banks, who bought paper, funded it either 
through the short-term money market or in order to 
employ free capital. These investors were yield curve 
driven, in other words, their concern was much less the 
absolute return on the paper, than that there should be 
a positive yield curve (positive carry) to give them 
gapping profit. To illustrate, assumes that Hong Kong 
dollar yield curve is positive with 3 month HIBOR at 6% 
while 3 year CD at 10%. Financial institution investors 
will buy the 3 year CD earning 10% and funds it by 3 
month HIBOR thus earning a 4% spread which is absolutely 
handsome• To allow positive funding, the yield curve has 
to be positive and this is usually when short-term 
interest rates are at historical low level which was the 
case for 1985 and 1986. Such interest rate scenario and 
investor behaviour helps to explain the development of 
the capital market. This is rather unique in Hong Kong 
as will be explained in later section about investor 
behaviour. 
i :1 
3/ Growing sophistication of local corporates 
The growth of capital market would have been difficult 
without the corresponding growing sophistication of the 
treasury departments of most large Hong Kong 
corporations. In addition, the big funding needs of MTRC 
during the period has been a major driving force behind 
the development of the local capital market。 Appendix 1 
shows the list of capital market instruments employed by 
MTRC since 1980. 
Growth in the debt capital market requires the existence 
of large borrowers who are receptive to new funding 
ideas apart from those of traditional commercial banking 
borrowings. With its huge investment needs and immense 
concern to achieve low cost of borrowings, MTRC emerged 
naturally as the colony's largest and most innovative 
borrower. The Corporation has also been the biggest user 
of swaps in Hong Kong, converting a total of HK$ 2 
billion of debt from floating to fixed rate only in 1985 
to 1986. In addition, MTRC also raised fixed rate 
financing directly through a HK$ 700 million bond issue 
in 1985. The corporation's readiness to try innovative 
ideas can be shown again by its being the first name 
trying out a sophisticated currency swap in 198^?" The 
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swap involved debt dominated in Yen and Hong Kong 
dollars. MTRC started by borrowing 10 billion Yen due to 
lower yen interest rate and swapped the Yen debt for 
medium term Hong Kong dollars so that MTRC ended up with 
a mixed fixed and floating rate Hong Kong dollar funds 
equivalent to 10 billion Yen. The mechanism of currency 
swap is similar to interest rate swap whereby credit 
arbitrage was explored for different borrowers in 
different currency markets. 
On top of MTRC, other local corporations like Hongkong 
Land, Jardines, utilities like Kowloon Electricity 
Supply Company Ltd, China Light & Power, Swire, Hong 
Kong Electric, and Hutichson Whampoa etc have also been 
active players in the development of the Hong kong 
capital market。 
CHAPTER 5 
DIFFICULTIES IN STEPPING FURTHER 
The remarkable growth during 1985 and 1986 was not 
without its difficulties. These underlying problems 
gradually emerged in 1987 which explained the rapid 
downturn of capital market activities。 Major problems 
facing market participants at that time were s 
1/ The lack of retail investors and failure to develop a 
secondary market : 
In a mature capital market, the presence of long term 
investors, ranging from pension funds to wealthy 
individuals, is essential to the stability and 
continuity of the market. This was not available in Hong 
Kong. In 1985 and 1986, average distribution percentage 
of HK$ debt instruments in terms of investor types a r e P 
Underwriting Banks 45% 
High networth individuals 10% 
Banks via asset swap 5% 
Hong Kong Corporates 10% 
Local non-underwriting banks 15% 
Others ^ 15% 
Total 100% 
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The above figure shows that majority of paper was held 
by banks. The danger for underwriting banks, or 
financial institutions to hold the majority of paper is 
that it would be very expensive to fund the paper when 
interest rate rises and liquidity dries up. If that 
happens, the financial institutions holding the paper 
and the underwriters will find themselves exposed to 
high risk as their funding cost will be higher than the 
return on the paper. It was felt that papers had to be 
distributed more evenly to a wider spectrum of end 
investors including pension funds, institutions and 
individuals• The problem can be illustrated as follows. 
Assumes that competition in the market drives price of 
new fixed rate issues out of line with the level at 
which investors want to buy. This results in paper being 
left in the books of underwriters who are then obliged 
to fund medium positions with short-term interbank 
funding. The greater the overhang of paper, the greater 
the fallout will be when interest rate rise to a level 
at which such interbank funding is no longer positive。 
Further assumes that the correct market rate for a new 5 
year CD issue is 8.7% a year, but because of competitive 
pressure, a lead manager decides to launch the issue at 
8.5%, it is unlikely that investors will buy the paper 
except at a significant loss to the underwriter. If 3 
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month HIBOR increases to a level where it begins to look 
likely that short-term funding will result in a negative 
gap, underwriters will scramble to dump the paper at any 
price, precipitating a collapse of the market. 
The nightmare came in the middle of 1987。 Due to the 
indigestion of paper and rising interest rates (3 month 
HIBOR rose from below 4% in January 1987 to over 7% in 
13 
June 1987), the fixed rate issue market suffered a 
setback. Demand within the financial system dried up 
almost overnight. Volume of new issues dropped 
significantly to the level of 1985. Simultaneously with 
the retrenchment of fixed rate debt market, there also 
witnessed a rationalization in the number of market 
participants. Those institutions which were not totally 
equipped to the development of the market and were weak 
in placement capabilities were left on the wayside« 
Appendix 2 shows the comparison of number of market 
participants in 1986 and 1988• Meanwhile, the remaining 
players were forced to broaden their respective investor 
base. Appendix 3 shows the change in percentage of paper 
holding in 1985 and 1987. The entry into the market of 
genuine retail investors, who do not rely on short-term 
interbank funding,, is therefore a necessary means to 
improve the infrastructure. 
2/ Government obstacle 
On top of the failure to develop a retail market, 
another major obstacle was the Government ^  s 
un-supportive attitude towards the capital markets 
Despite its philosophy of non-intervention, the 
Government has turned away an attempt by the World Bank 
to raise financing in the Hong Kong capital market in 
1985. The Government's stand was that they did not want 
the Hong Kong dollar to become an international 
currency, circulating outside the Government's control。 
The Government, before 1989, had been hostile to any 
issues in Hong Kong dollar if the borrower did not have 
a natural need for the local currency. Such issues, it 
was argued, might cause massive fund flows in and out of 
the territory and bring undue pressure on Hong Kong 
dollar's link to the greenback. The main concern was 
that non—residential borrowers, who usually have little 
use for the Hong Kong dollar they borrowed, would switch 
the proceeds into other currencies and might thus 
destabilize the exchange value of the local currency. 
The effect of such attitude thus restricted the number 
of quality issuers in the Hong Kong dollar market. 
T / 
RESPONSE OF MARKET PARTICIPANTS 
In response to these difficulties, market participants 
initiated two major moves to counter the negative 
effects : 
1/ The formation of the Capital Markets Association 
The Assocation was formed in 1985 by leading market 
participants majority of which were foreign based 
merchant banks. The Association's principal objective 
was to solve the various problems of, and, to promote 
growth in the secondary market. 
2/ Development of Hong Kong Dollar Money Market F u n d 14 
To encourage participation of retail investors, Hong 
Kong Dollar Money Market funds were developed in 1986c 
One difficulty for small investors to participate 
relates to the miniinun denomination of capital market 
instruments. Under the Hong Kong Association of Bank 
rules, miniinun demonination for capital market 
instruments is HK$ 500,000。 Therefore, despite that 
re七urn from a CD is usually a few hundred basis point 
over savings rate, small investors have, to a large 
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extent, been barred from investing in capital market 
instruments. Under such circumstances, larger banks 
decided to promote mutual funds for the investment of 
fixed rate CDs. This was hoped to broaden the retail 
base, such that the public was able to invest in the 
higher yielding paper. The development of such funds 
was targetted to fill the gap in the market for 
investors with more than HK$ 50,000 but less than HK$ 
500,000 to invest. A Money Market Fund pools money to 
buy capital market issues. However, although nine funds 
had been approved at the end of February 1987 by the 
Securities Commission, only five had actually been 
launched. It appeared that the launch was not at very 
good timing for two reasons. In the first place, the 
prevailing low interest rates, under which the gap 
between the yields on CP or CD on the one hand, and bank 
deposits on the other hand had been considerably 
narrowed so that there was not much extra attraction for 
investors to take-up price risk in a Money Market Fund. 
Secondly, as with any other fixed- rate securities. 
Money Market Funds managed by the professional managers 
were also investing in a diversified fixed income Hong 
Kong dollar securities. The risk of any fixed rate 
securities is that its price falls as market interest 
rates move up. Following the prevailing low interest 
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rate, there saw in 1987 to 1988 the climbing up of 
interest rates gradually from the 6% range to over 10%. 
Under such circumstances, Money Market Funds lost its 
attraction even before many investors had successfully 
understood how they operate。 As a result, all the funds 




The market went through two do1drum years in 1987 and 
1988 until new lights were shedded. Optimism revived in 
late 1988 with the occurance of several events s 
1/ Change in the Government's attitude towards non Hong 
Kong borrowers : 
By late 1988, the Government made its first blessing for 
an international borrower to tap the Hong Kong dollar 
capital market. This opened up the expectation that 
forign corporations would be allowed to raise money via 
the Hong Kong dollar capital market. This maiden 
international issue was a HK$ 391 million 10 years Fixed 
Rate Bond issued by the Qantas Airline guaranteed by the 
Commonwealth Government of Australia. 
The Qantas issue offered the tantalising propsect of a 
wider issuing base. As explained before, the Government 
had previously set its face against internationalization 
of the Hong Kong dollar market, with the result that 
offshore issuers were strongly discouraged. Although the 
Government was moving cautiously and would want to 
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consider proposal on a case by case basis, it now looked 
as though foreign issuers would be permitted so long as 
there was some kind of genuine connection with Hong 
Kong. The presence of some top-rated international 
corporates, and preferrably some foreign or supre=-
national borrowers was badly needed by the market. The 
Government's move was encouraging. 
Following this issue, Qantas tapped the market again in 
March 1989 for another HK$ 397 million. In addition, the 
World Bank also launched two fixed rate bonds in 1989 
and 1990 respectively. The World Bank issue marked a 
milestone for the local capital market as it came hard 
on the heeds of the Government's announcement of major 
change in its capital market policy. Listed below are 
the details of these issues by non- HK based borrowers^ 
Launch date Issuer Amount Tenor 
1/Nov 1988 Qantas Airway HK$ 391 Million 10 years 
2/May 1989 Qantas Airway HK$ 397 Million 10 years 
3/May 1989 World Bank HK$ 500 Million 6 years 
4/Feb 1990 World Bank HK$ 500 Million 6 years 
The reasons for .the Government's change in policy are 
two folded. Firstly, since July 1988, the Government 
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Exchange Fund has replaced the Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank 
as supplier of inter-bank liquidity. By taking action 
under the new arrangement, the Government is much better 
placed to ensure exchange rate stability and to counter 
the effects arising from switching by non-resident 
borrowers into or out of foreign currenciese Secondly, 
the Government started to believe that many local 
investors, particularly the institutional ones who had 
been forced to place their funds in foreign currencies 
because of the short supply of high quality Hong Kong 
dollar assets, might switch funds back if quality debt 
issues were availablec 
2/ Abolition of withholding tax ； 
The second major breakthrough was the abolition of 
withholding tax in April, 1 1989。 Before this date, 
corporate issues attracted interest tax unless the paper 
was held by banks. However, return on corporate paper is 
relatively unattractive to bank investors under the 
latest capital adequacy controls. The elimination of 
interest tax means that corporate bonds can be held by 
non-bank institutional investors like pension funds, 
trusts etc on exactly the same basis as bank CDs。 This 
should help opening up the door for corporate issuers 
who now accounts for less than 10% of total volume。 
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CHAPTER 10 
DEMAND FOR CAPITAL MARKET INSTRUMENTS ~ INVESTORS ^  RISK 
The above analysis reveals that despite that the capital 
market has a relatively short life, it has already 
experienced a high tide and a low tide. As analysed, 
there have been a number of factors affecting the growth 
of the capital market. This section will examine the 
factors from a demand and supply perspective to see how 
they affect the fate of the capital market. 
Demand for capital market instruments represents the 
investors' side, ie, why investors should hold capital 
market instruments. This can be discussed in terms of 
risk and return. This chapter examines risk and the next 
chapter discusses return. 
Risk of a capital market instrument can be analysed in 
terms of quality risk, liquidity risk, price risk and 
currency risk. 
In terms of quality risk, the Hong Kong dollar capital 
market can be said to be a quality market. As shown in 































































































































































































































































































































issuers rated single A or better. The vast majority of 
CDs outstanding are from AA to AAA banks. When compared 
to other investment opportunities like the stock market 
or the properties market, quality of capital market is 
relatively high and there is nothing similar to the Junk 
Bonds in the US. The major problem here is that there is 
no credit ratings, like those provided by Standard & 
Poors, or Moodys, for investors to measure the risk/ 
return on corporate papers. This explains why so few 
local corporates have issued bond as market participants 
and investors, both institutions and individuals, have 
been taking a very conservative approach towards the 
capital market especially during the infant stagec 
As for liquidity risk, at its most extreme, liquidity 
means being able to liquidate an asset at the same price 
as it is purchased. This can only be true in the case of 
a call deposit. Any other assets involve some price risk 
if you wish to obtain an immediate sale. At the other 
end of the scale, liquidity can just mean that there 
will be someone ready to buy the paper at some price, 
or, at any price. 
Liquidity in a bond market is a function of three-
factors. The first is the number of market players, ie, 
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the degree of competition among professionals to ensure 
that there always has a decent price. The second is the 
size of bid/offered spread, ie, the wider the spread, 
the lesser the liquidity. And the third is the size in 
which professionals would trade the papers. 
On the bid/offered spread, the market matches up fairly 
well. Typically, prices tend to be quoted with a spread 
of between 1/4% and 1/2% between bid and offer, that is 
not out of line with the Euro market where a 1/4% tends 
to be typical for primary issues• Therefore, on the 
bid/offered price, the market does not look too bad. 
Where the market really falls down is the number of 
market makers and the size of deals. There are really 
only a few consistent market makers in the range of 
issues. Appendix 4 shows the list of market players and 
their respective shares in the market. During bull 
phases, a large number of market-makers appears but 
liquidity is not much use if it is only there during the 
good times of the market. 
Without an active highly liquid "traded'® market, the 
Hong Kong dollar .capital market is primarily placement-
driven. Bonds are placed with investors at payment and 
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are mostly locked away until maturity. This implies that 
the new issues sector is dominated by a small number of 
merchant banks. In a traded market, minor participants 
can stay in the new-issues game by subsidising this 
activity with trading income. But a placement driven 
market rapidly eliminates the banks which do not possess 
geniune access to end-investors. As the table shows, the 
top three lead managers account for 62% of total new 
issue volume and the number of underwriting banks is 
down 25% from the 1986 level. This is a vicious cycle as 
only the top merchant banks can make enough from leading 
new issues to be able to afford a trading capacity. 
Investors tend to buy paper from banks who have traders 
and who can, therefore, offer some element of liquiditye 
Hence, it is only those banks that have a sufficient 
investor base to remain on top of the new—issues market。 
With respect to price risk, the price of fixed income 
securities is a function of interest rates. If market 
interest rates move up, price of the security moves down 
and vice versa. Investment appeal of fixed income 
securities come from two sources. The first is when 
interest rates have moved to levels that are highly 
competitive with (other securities. The second is when 
market rates will fluctuate wide enough to provide 
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investors with attractive capital gain opportunities» 
Therefore, bonds and other forms of fixed income 
securities provide investors with two kinds of income, 
fixed current income and potential capital gain. 
In the US and Euro markets, fixed rate securities have 
long been regarded as excellent vehicles for those 
seeking current income, but it has only been since the 
advent of high and volatile interest rates that they 
have also become recognised as excellent trading 
vehicles« This is so because investors have found that 
the number of profitable trading opportunities has 
increased as wider and more frequent swings in interest 
rates has begun to occur. 
As for Hong Kong, given such kind of price risk, the 
best investor base is people who are looking for 
continuous, stable source of fixed income to match more 
or less precise liabilities stream, and whose concern is 
yield rather than the shape of the yield curve. Good 
candidates should therefore be charities, pension funds, 
insuirance companies, trusts etc. For retail or 
individuals who look for short-term trading and capital 
gains, their concern will be interest rate and yield 
curve. However, unless interest rate is very volatile or 
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unless it leans in either the high or low end, interest 
rate movement, in the short run, is not usually wide 
enough for very active speculative trading。 
Meanwhile, pension funds, which are able to project 
forward cashflows on an actuarial basis are obviously 
buyers of fixed rate paper. Insurance companies, 
property/casualty insurers have shorter liability 
streams that are statistically predictable and fixed 
rate paper is also an inherently attractive medium. 
Charities, educational trusts are another group of 
potential buyer. Fixed rate paper should also be an 
attractive alternative for these investors to diversify 
away from common stock。 The fact that many of these 
institutions have committed 90%-95% to the stock market 
by their fund managers at the time of the 1987 crash^^ 
should have taught some painful lessons. However, 
despite that capital market instruments are appropiate 
investments for these institutions. Chart 6 shows that a 
large portion of these funds have been investing in the 
equities market. The major reason is that if the debt 
market is less liquid and interest rate is not expected 
to fall (thus generating capital gains), the equities 
market has provided a better return especially in the 
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economic fundamentals to support. It is necessary to 
remember that pension funds or insurance fund managers 
are also becoming more performance oriented, thus risk 
and cashflow matching may not be their major concerns. 
A separate group, who are investing slowly, are 
corporate buyers. There are two basic problems for them, 
one is legislative, the other is structural. The 
legislative one is that corporates find it hard to 
justify buying Hong Kong dollar paper when they need to 
pay profits tax on these papers while no profits tax is 
levied on foreign currency p a p e r 丄7 ^he structural 
problem is a more difficult one. Majority of corporates 
with investment funds are for short-term trading 
purposes and liquidity is thus a principal concern. Even 
if the tax point is resolved, it is still doubtful that 
these corporates will ever become big buyers of medium 
term paper unless the liquidity of the market improves^ 
The final risk for investors relates to currencye In 
1985, the market's rapid development was helped by a 
fundamental change in Hong Kong's financial structuree 
This was the peg between Hong Kong dollar and US dollar。 
Without the currency stability introduced by the link, 
the capital market couldn't have taken off. Investors 
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participated in the Hong Kong dollar market because they 
could be relatively relaxed that they would not incur 
currency loss. There is no sense of speculation on the 
peg at the moment as the Government appears to be very 
firm in defending the peg. However, recent events in 
China highlighted by the June Fourth Incident and its 
aftermath has substantially shakened confidence in the 
future of Hong Kong and thus affected the confidence in 
Hong Kong dollar. Despite that there appears to be a 
consensus that the Hong Kong dollar would not be 
devalued within the near future, one has less confidence 
to say that during the last few years before 1997, the 
currency would definitely retain its present strength。 
This is confirmed by the fact that Hong Kong dollar 
deposits have been contracting since the June crackdown 
in Beijing. Hong Kong dollar deposits fell by 0.4% in 
June 1989, 0.4% in August and 0.1 % in October? In 
constrast, foreign currency deposits rose by a 
substantial 3.3% in October, following a rise of 1.1% in 
1 9 
August and 0.8% in Sept. The most worrying sign is that 
investors in Hong Kong dollar are less willing to invest 
in long term instruments with maturity beyond five 
years. Of all the fixed rate issues launched in the Hong 
Kong dollar market after June 1989, only one CD has a 
maturity beyond five years ？。 
CHAPTER 5 
DEMAND FOR CAPITAL MARKET INSTRUMENTS - INVESTORS^ 
RETURN 
As explained, investors in fixed rate instruments are 
basically looking for two kinds of returns s 1/ fixed 
interest income and 2/ capital gain when interest rate 
falls. As for fixed interest income, data shows that 
Hong Kong dollar instruments has been providing better 
returns than comparable alternative in US Treasuries, 
Chart 7 shows the comparison between return on Hong Kong 
dollar instruments and return on US dollar instruments c 
For a three-year Hong Kong dollar CD, yield has almost 
been consistently higher than three-year Treasuries. 
Since most Hong Kong dollar CDs are of triple A credit� 
plus that the Hong Kong dollar is pegged to US dollar, 
the spread over Treasuries can be seen as risk premium 
for three factors : 1/ a small portion for the credit 
differential between triple A bank and the US 
Government； 2/ possible repegging or devaluation of Hong 
Kong dollar against US dollar before maturity; and 3/ 
more importantly, the premium to compensate for the lack 




























































































































































































































As for potential capital gain, despite that there is 
liquidity difficulties in the Hong Kong market, interest 
rate volatility of Hong Kong dollar for the past few 
years has been high enough for significant price 
movement. The same chart shows the movement of 3 month 
HIBOR from 1986 to 1989. HIBOR ranged from the lowest at 
almost 1% to a top of 12% in 1989. This suggests high 
volatility part of which can be explained by intense 
speculation over the possibility of repeg of Hong Kong 
dollar during the period. However, despite the high 
volatility, it is difficult for investors to achieve 
capital gain as there is no short-selling of CDs to 
create a position that can generate gain when interest 
rate goes up. In the US, investors can sell short US 
Treasuries in anticiaption of rising interest rates but 
there is no such course in Hong Kong. Therefore, capital 
gain can only be achieved should interest rate goes 
down. However, under such circumstances, the proceeds 
from sales of the bonds/CDs will have to be reinvested 
in a lower interest rate environment and part of the 
capital gain from the sale will be forfeited. 
On top of the yield and capital gain, the major problem 
affecting the return for investors is a tax issuec The 
market is still severly hampered by the tax anomaly 
5 6 
Whereby Hong Kong corporates are effectively encouraged 
to invest their funds offshore or in foreign currencies 
in a tax free basis, as any investment in the local 
capital instruments is subject to profits tax. Thus, 
investing surplus funds in foreign currency deposits or 
"swap"21 deposits are not liable to profits tax. It is 
argued by the Hong Kong Capital Markets Association that 
certain instruments should be treated as investment 
assets to be freed from profits tax if they are held in 
the hands of corporate investors. These could include 
short term instruments held from issue to maturity or 
medium to long term instruments held for a prescribed 
period of time. This profits tax issue has been another 
obstacle hindering the development of the Hong Kong 
dollar capital market and unless the Government is ready 
to abolish this, it will continue to pose a hurdle for a 
broader investor base。 
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CHAPTER 9 
SUPPLY OF HONG KONG DOLLAR CAPITAL MARKET INSTRUMENTS 
On the demand side, there are basically three major 
factors influencing the growth of the market s 
1/ The lack of a major player - the Government 
Unlike most other major financial centres in the world. 
Hong Kong does not have a major borrower in the capital 
market 一 the Government. In most countries, government 
borrowings constitute an important part in capital 
market because of the enormous size involved and the 
variety of maturities that are unmatched by private 
borrowers. For example, there are the Treasury Bills, 
Notes, and Bonds by the US Government, Gilts in UK , and 
JGB in Japan. 
The situation is completely different in Hong Kong。 The 
Government pursues a highly conservative fiscal policy. 
The budget is generally balanced, though in 1982-1985 
deficits were actually incurred due to the slump in land 
22 
sales• The Government had only borrowed twice, once in 
1976 and the second in 1985 with a 5 year bond for 
5 8 
HK$ 1 billion which matured last year. One of the 
reasons for the non-existence of Government debt is that 
for major infrastructure development like mass transit, 
public transport, etc, the Government has been 
franchising or setting up private or quasi-government 
entities to run. Borrowings are through these entities 
instead of directly by the Government. Examples of such 
are the mass Transit Railway, Cross Harbour Tunnel, 
Kowloon-Canton Railway etc. 
This has two major impacts on the development of local 
capital market. In the first place, the absence of 
Government bonds means the lack of a benchmark against 
which other credits can be meansured and ranked。 It is 
generally accepted that Government borrowing is risk 
free and the credit spread for other private borrowers 
are usually set on the risk free rate. In the US, the US 
Treasury yield has been used as an indicator for long 
term borrowing rates while the treasury bill rate 
provides a benchmark rate for short term instruments。 If 
there were bonds in the market issued by the Government 
or a Government guaranteed entity, additional borrowing 
opportunities in the fixed rate Hong Kong dollar could 
be opened up for private sector enterprises。 
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The second impact is more often being neglected but is 
far more important in the current context. The existence 
of government bond with different maturities can also 
provide an effective risk free hedging medium for market 
players in managing interest rate riske For example, if 
an investor or an underwriter is uncertain about 
interest rate movement, he can on the one hand buy (or 
underwrite) the fixed rate instrument, say, a 5 year 
fixed rate CD, and on the other hand, sell short a 5 
year government bond to hedge until he is comfortable 
with the future trend of interest rate movement. If 
interest rate moves up, price of the CD will fall and he 
will loss on the CD, however, he will gain from his 
short position in the government bond as he can buy back 
at a cheaper price. The lack of such hedging medium in 
Hong Kong hinders the development of the market。 
New development was seen recently. In February 199 0, the 
Government Exchange Fund Bills was launched。 However, it 
was the Government‘s proclaimed aim that the 91 day bill 
is only the Government‘s tool for market intervention 
rather than a means to borrow. The Fund's primary 
function is to defend the stability of the Hong Kong 
dollar by manupulating money in circulation and thus 
influencing interest rates. Prior to the launching of 
6 0 
the Bills, the Government through the Exchange Fund had 
been managing the currency via the account with The Hong 
Kong & Shanghai Bank. When Hong Kong dollar is stronger 
than the peg level of 7.8, the account's balance would 
be increased. The Fund performed this by buying foreign 
currency or other assets with Hong Kong dollars, lending 
Hong Kong dollars to banks or transfer money to general 
revenues and other funds. With the Bills, the same 
objective can be achieved by buying back Fund Billse The 
operation will be reversed if Hong Kong dollar is weaker 
than the pegged rate. With nominal value of HK$ 500,000 
each, the Bill is again expected to interest primarily 
professional or institutional investors rather than 
smaller players. 
Meanwhile, with the Government's mammoth HK$ 127 billion 
airport and port projects, the Government may consider 
raising long term capital by issuing Government bonds。 
The Governement has so far no indication on such and the 
major concern currently among market players is whether 
such hugh fund is available from investors. As explained 
before, the major difficulty for the Hong Kong capital 
market now is the lack of investor interest, or more 
appropiately, investor confidence in placing long t e m 
committed funds in Hong Kong. Unless there is any 
6 1 
positive change, this would pose a major hindrance to 
the further development of the Hong Kong capital marketc 
2/ Lack of foreign borrowers and local corporations with 
acceptable risk : 
The second major difficulty is the lack of issuers or 
borrowers. Despite that the World Bank and Qantas have 
each tapped the market twice, not many other potential 
candidates are available. Very few foreign borrowers 
have international Hong Kong dollar needs thus most of 
them will have to swap the proceeds into other 
currencies. However, the Hong Kong dollar swap market 
has failed to develop into an active market due to the 
lack of hedging instruments as will be explained below. 
The thin swap market makes it difficult for foreign 
borrowers to swap the proceeds from local issues 
efficiently into the currency of ultimate needs. Swaps 
are expensive because the market is illiquid, with 
insufficient participants to enable equilibrium level to 
be identified. Currently, there are only about five to 
six active players in the Hong Kong dollar swap market 
most of which are foreign based investment banks which 
are also the same players in the capital market. Due to 
the lack of players, it is very often that either 
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everyone wants to pay fixed and receive floating, or 
vice versa. Finding a counterparty with a different view 
is therefore difficult. This is where the lack of 
adequate hedging instruments, such as a liquid, medium 
term Hong Kong dollar Government bond, which swap 
traders could sell short as a hedge, become apparent. In 
the absence of a hedging mechanism, swap traders either 
have to find two matching counterparts or to run an open 
interest rate risk. Given the volatility of Hong Kong 
dollar interest rate, the latter is risky• 
Again, new development is arriving. In February 1990, 
the 3-month Hongkong Interbank Offered Rate (HIBOR》 
Future contract was launched. The HIBOR contracts 
provide a hedging mechanism to protect borrowers and 
lenders against adverse rate movements« The protection 
afforded by the contracts should encourage further 
commitment of investible funds and assumption of debt 
obligations for longer periods. This should help to 
remove one of the major constraints in the growth of the 
money and capital markets in Hong Kong. 
The contracts has a standard size of HK$ 1 million and 
is offered for trading months of March, June, September, 
December up to two years ahead. As the contracts have 
2 0 
been just launched, its results and impact on the local 
capital market has still to be seen. 
3/ Alternative fund raising means : 
The development of capital market activities is also a 
function of its competitive position as against other 
funding alternatives. In Hong Kong, 90% of the world,s 
50 largest banks are represented, and there are over 150 
licensed banks, over 300 registered or licensed 
deposit—taking companies. The total deposit liabilities 
of all the licensed banks to customers at the end of 
23 
1988 was over HK$ 779 billion. Commercial banking 
activities are well and long established as against the 
infant stage of capital market activities which was only 
born in the 80's. Fierce competition among commercial 
banks results in very much reduced cost for borrowers to 
raise fund via conventional bank borrowings. In 
addition, raising fund via conventional bank loan is 
much simpler and less costly than via capital market. 
For example, there is much less legal work involved and 
most documentation is standardized. Meanwhile, under the 
Protection of Investors Ordinance, there are a number of 
disclosure requirements like the issuance of a 
prospectus, registration etc which is required for a 
I香浪中文大學回贲你藏 " ^厂 
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corporate bond. Therefore, unless the amount to be 
raised is very large, it is not very economical to 
conduct through the capital market. This is especially 
true for Hong Kong as majority of private enterprises 
are of medium size. This also explains why private 
issues have largely been restricted to large utilities 
or conglomerates. For many others, time and expenses 
involved in producing a full prospectus complying with 
all the relevant requirements will dissuade them from 
issuing bonds. Cost savings in raising fund via capital 
market instruments is often not large enough to 
compensate for the effort and cost involved« 
The dominance of Hong Kong's commercial banking sector 
as the primary source of external corporate finance has 
thus slowed down the development of a capital market. 
On top of commercial banking, there is also the stock 
market which is another alternative for raising capital。 
In Hong Kong, stockbroking has a long history dating 
back to the first share trading in 1866 and to the 
formation of the first stock exchange in 1914。 The 
Hongkong stock market is well—established with total 
24 
market capitalization over HKD 600 billion。 Due to the 
great liquidity and popularity in the stock market. 
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investors, both institutional and individual, have shown 
greater interest in the stock market. 
The development of the local capital market is therefore 
also a function of performance in the stock markete 
During stock market slumps, investors will shift to 
other alternatives and the stock market will not be a 
cheap ground for borrowers to raise funds。 During such 
times, it is difficult for a corporate to raise large 
amount of fund as the market is unable to support even a 
small 10% right issue. This is evidenced by some recent 
phenomenon in Hong Kong. Recognising the recent 
sluggishness in the stock market, corporations who have 
previously not been major players in the capital market 
started to raise funds via the capital market. For 
example, Lai Sun Development raised HK$ 500 million via 
a convertible bond in late 1989, followed by THL 
International with another HK$ 500 million convertible 
bond in early 1990. San Miguel launched its maiden CP 




The above analysis on demand and supply does not paint a 
rosy picture for the future outlook of the Hong Kong 
capital market. On the demand side, due to the 
illiquidity and non-existence of a secondary market, 
capital market instruments are largely barred from 
corporate investors. Thus, investor base will still be 
confined to institutions like pension funds, insurance 
companies, charities etc. Though this represents a much 
bigger step than the bank investor base in 1985, the 
limited number of end investors will still pose major 
difficulties for a big step forward. In addition, the 
concern over the future of Hong Kong, and. Hong Kong 
dollar, is greatly affecting the market as investors 
have been refraining from committing long term in Hong 
Kong dollars. Without long term investors, the capital 
market is virtually losing its function。 Meanwhile� 
structural problems like the profits tax, minimum 
demonination of instruments etc are still hindering the 
growth of capital market activities。 
The picture has more bright colour on the supply side。 
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The infrastructure projects, whether it be financed by 
the Government directly or by private entities, means 
that hugh demand for Hong Kong dollar will be upcoming. 
In addition, multi-nationals, or large local 
corporations who are beginning to feel the impact on the 
shrinking Hong Kong dollar deposit base, are now forced 
to think long term. For those corporations that are 
ready to stay in the Hong Kong business in the future, 
the diminishing Hong Kong dollar base represents a 
possible shortage of future funding source for their 
expansion or refunding. Basic demand and supply suggests 
that shortage in supply will push up price。 This means 
that borrowing in the future may cost more。 With such 
considerations, it is not surprising to see that many 
corporations are trying to obtain huge long term 
committed funding now at a fixed cost before it is too 
late. After the two crashes and the general lack of 
confidence in its aftermath, the stock market may not be 
an easy path for raising sufficient funds. 
This is therefore the major problem faced by market 
participants and the further growth of the market 
depends on how successful market participants are able 
to bridge the gap between supply and demand. In the 
past, development of local capital market has very much 
68 
been shaped by external factors like prevailing interest 
rates, emergence of swaps, etc. Even though many of the 
structural obstacles like withholding tax. Government 
attitude, etc have been tackled by the Capital Markets 
Association and market players, the road is still rough 
and obstructed by other issues like the profits tax, 
insufficient hedging instruments, etc. Given the nature 
of risk and return of instruments, the confined investor 
and borrower base, it is hard to expect a spectacular 
breakthrough or revival of activities in the near 
future. However, it is also unlikely that the market 
will submerge totally as it provides an attractive 
alternative to conventional borrowings and investment» 
It is beyond the scope of this project to provide a way 
out, but given that everything has a price, it is 
conceivable that given certain risk premium, there 
should be a meeting point between demand and supply. In 
addition, the higher premium may not be an absolute 
higher cost for the borrower. It can also be constructed 
so that the higher required return by investors is in 
form of some potential calculated benefits for the 
investors, and some calculated risk for the borrower。 
Recent issues in the market like the convertible bonds 
is an example whereby the "sweetener", for investors is 
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in form of potential gain in future stock price rise. 
Other possible alternatives are interest rate or 
currency plays whereby the investors are given the right 
to benefit should interest rates or currency move in 
their favour. The borrowers bear such interest rate or 
currency risk in return for obtaining long term fixed 
rate funds at acceptable cost. 
In sum, the capital market is definitely a difficult but 
challenging and interesting arena for market 
participants and its future development is affecting and 
being affected by the whole financial community» As 
previously stated, securitization provides borrowers 
cheaper means of financing and investors alternative 
opportunities with better yield. The non-development of 
the Hong kong capital market will definitely be viewed 
as a loss to either side and it is now a major test to 
the participants' will-power to drive a way out through 
the thorny road. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1/ On October 17, 1987, stock markets of major financial 
markets including Hong Kong crashed. The Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange then ordered the temporary closure of 
the market for four days. There were widespread 
discontent over this discision and also over the 
operation of the Stock Exchange. The Government then 
appointed a Securities Review Committee headed by Hay 
Davison to investigate the operation and structure of 
the Hong Kong stock market. The Committee recommended 
a wide range of reforms over the structure and legal 
framework governing the stock market and most of the 
reforms were later carried out by the Government. 
2/ source - The Guide to 工 i n t e r n a t i o n a l Capital Markets 
1989 pg 89. Euroitioney Publication Pic 
3/ source - Manufacturers Hanover Asia Ltd 
4/ Minimax - it is a structure which incorporates the 
essentials of fixed rate and floating rate 
instruments so that the interest rate is set within 
a band of miniinum and maximum limits within which it 
floats. MTRC launched a HK$ 1.1 billion FRN with 
Minimax structure in 1986 arranged by Manufacturers 
Hanover Asia Ltd. 
5/ Bulls and Bears - it is a structure so that a bond is 
split into two tranches with one tranche paying 
normal floating rate interest and the second tranche 
paying a pre-detemined fixed rate less HIBOR. The 
effect of combining the two tranches is a synthetic 
fixed rate for the issuer. The investors can, however 
choose to invest in both tranches to achieve fixed 
return, or to invest in either tranche to achieve 
floating return. 
71 
6/ Mismatches — it is a structure whereby interest rate 
is linked with 6 month HIBOR but rate is re-set every 
mon’h with market fluctuation, and payment is made 
semi-annually. Mismatches can be of any difference in 
tenor, eg, 1 month Vs 3 month； 3 month Vs 6 month. 
MTRC also launched a HK$ 2.5 billion transferrable 
loan with mismatches in 1987. 
7/ source - Manufacturers Hanover Asia Ltd 
8/ source 一 Hong Kong Capital Markets Association 
9/ see pg 54 - 3 month Hong Kong Dollar Interbank 
Offered rate graph for 1986-1989. 
10/ see pg 33 一 Distribution of HK$ paper during 1985 --
1986 
11/ source — Mass Transit Railway Corp。 Financial 
Presentation 1989 
12/ source - Manufacturers Hanover Asia Ltd 
13/ see pg 54 - 3 month Hong Kong Dollar Interbank 
Offered rate graph for 1986-1989• 
14/ The name "Money Market Funds" is actually a misnomer 
as unlike the money market funds in the United 
States, ‘ these then newly launched "Money Market 
Funds" in Hong Kong were investing funds in capital 
market instruments with tenor beyond one year and 
mostly in fixed rate capital market instruments. The 
term "Money Market" was used by the promoters 
probably because these funds were targetted for small 
retail investors and the term "Money Market" might be 
laore easier to be accepted than "Capital Market" 
which sounded too sophisticated and did not quite 
serve the purpose. 
12 
15/ source - Manufacturers Hanover Asia Ltd 
16/ source - Wyatt 1988 Annual Report on the performance 
of retirement funds 
17/ see pg 55 — 56 discussion on tax issues 
18/ source -Government Monthly Digest June 1989 to 
January 1990 
19/ 工 b i d 
2 0/ source - Manufacturers Hanover Asia Ltd 
21/ "Swap deposit" - this "swap" is not the type of swap 
discussed in pages 26—29 of Chapter 4 but is a much 
simpler mechanism operated by banks to place HK$ 
deposits in foreign currencies. In Hong Kong, many 
banks offer US$ offshore deposit for customers and 
the redemption value in HK$ is fixed at the same rate 
as the initial exchange rate at the time of deposit 
placement so that investors are placing US$ deposit 
which is not subject to profits tax but without 
incurring any exchange risk. 
2 2/ source - TK Ghose, The Banking System OF Hong Kong 
23/ source - Hong Kong, Annual report 1989, 
24/ source - "Total Market Capitalization of Listed 
Companies in Hong Kong" page R72, The Securities 
Bulletin, August 1989. Published b y t h e S t o c k 
Exchange of Hong Kong. 
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APPENDIX 1 - MAJOR CAPITAL MARKET INSTRUMENTS 
EMPLOYED BY MTRC SINCE 1980 -‘ 
^ M l t y Amount Term Arranaerfs) 
(Years) 
1982 HK5 Commercial Paper HKS200M 3 Wardiey 
1983 HKS Commercial Paper HKS600M 3 Wardley/Barciays 
1984 U.S. Commercial Paper USS1OOM 3 Goldman Sachs/Barclays 
Transferable Loan HK$500M 5 Citicorp 
HKS FRN HK$500M 8 Morgan Guaranty 
US^FRN US$75M 10 Mcraan 
w 
. - _ HK$ Commercial Paper HK5800M 3 Schroders 
1985 Exchangeable Bond HK$700M 10 Morgan 
ECU Bond ECU50M 5.5 Paribas 
HKS Commercial Paper HKS800M 5 Wsrdley 
.Transferable Loan HK22,000M 10 Wsrdley/Sanwa 、 
1986 FRN with Mini-max HKS1,100M 7 ManHan 
Eurocommercial Paper US$1 OOM 7 Merriil Lynch/ ‘ • 
. . . . … . w i t h Euroyen Option Morgan/Warourg/ 
Daiwa 
Yen Private Bond YEN10,OOOM 7 Sanwa " 
("Shibosai") 
Bun F R N / F R N ("FIRST’’） HK$750M 5 Lloyds/ManHan 
US3 FRN with Warrants USS85M 5 Psnbas 
for HK$ 巳…丨 FRN + HK$663M “ 
1987 Alternative _ . 一. . HK$500M 5 Paribas 
Interest Rate Bond 
Multi-currency Short A$100M 2 , 已 a n k e r s Trust 
Term Note 
HK$ Commercial Paper HKS2,500M 5 Schroders/Wardley 
U.S. Commercial Paper US$1 OOM 3 Goldman Sachs 
Transferable Loan HK$2,500M 10 Chemical/ManHan 
with Mismatch 
1988 Step-up Bond HK$200M 7 Wardiey 
Yen Public Bond Yen10,OOOM 7 Nomura/Sanwa 
("Samurai") 
CAN$ Eurobond CANSIOOM 3 Citicorp 
Transferable Loan HK$400M 15 Paribas 
With Mismatch 
HK，S3 Dual Currency HK$3,000M 1 to 7 Morgan/Chase/Goidman 
Med丨um Term Note _ Sachs/Mem丨丨 Lynch/ 
Schroders/Warburg 
Transferable Loan HK$540M 18 CiticorD 
Variable Margin ‘ 
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APPENDIX 2 
HONG KONG DOLLAR FIXED RATE ISSUES 
LIST OF MARKET PLAYERS 
1986 1988 
MANAGERS ARRANGING AT LEAST 2 ISSUES IN THE YEAR 
Bank of Communications ANZ Securities 
BT Asia Bank of Communications 
Barclays CEF Capital 
Chase Manhattan 工 n d o s u e z Asia 
Citicorp Manufacturers Hanover 
Grindleys Paribas Asia 
Indosuez Asia Schroders Asia , 






MANAGERS ARRANGING ONLY 1 ISSUE IN THE YEAR 
ANZ Securities BT Asia 
CCIC Chase Manhattan 
China Development Industrial Bank of Japan 
Lloyds Morgan Guaranty 
Orion Royal Sanwa 
Sanwa 
Standard Chartered 
Source : Manufacturers Hanover Asia Ltd 
APPENDIX 3 
HONG KONG DOLLAR FIXED RATE ISSUES 
DISTRIBUTION BY CUSTOMER BASE 
1986 1988 
(Percentage) 
Pension Funds 2 2.0 20.0 
Insurance Companies 2.7 8.0 
Charities 3.0 1。0 
Trusts 0.7 3c0 
Corporates o.6 7«0 
Overseas Investors 0。4 11。0 
High networth Individuals 7.6 5.6 
Local Banks 17。0 5,4 
PRC Banks 4.0 22.0 
Foreign Banks/DTCs 3 5.0 17,0 
Bank Asset Swap 7.0 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
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